so it's a yardstick as senator dodd said. >> thank you all. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> secretary of state hillary clinton spoke about the september limit attack in

benghazi libya's in the state department cannot prevent every act of violence directed overseas diplomats. she was the keynote speaker at a conference on north africa, hosted by the center for strategic and international studies. this is about 40 minutes. >> been none of are very hard. the first job is i want to welcome my friends, the investors morocco and algeria and the moroccan league. after a keynote address is done if you all remain in your seats to help get the party out of the room and my third task is to introduce somebody who probably needs less of an introduction than anybody in washington, general brent scowcroft is a legend in washington and is a retired lieutenant general in the air force national security visor to president gerald ford and george h. w. bush and a graduate of west point and holds a ph.d. from columbia. i think for all of us who worked with him he is a model of

judgment and probity here in washington. user counselor and it's my pleasure to introduce general brent scowcroft to introduce our speaker. thank you. [applause] >> good afternoon. this is a real pleasure for me to be able to stand here for john hamre and introduce our speaker today. is a testament to the importance of north africa to global security, that the secretary of state taken the time to address this conference on the maghreb transition. the forces that are surging through to the airport right now had many of their -- in the maghreb and some of the most promising opportunities for

positive change in the region also had their origins in maghreb. we have also seen tragedy in the maghreb but we cannot forget that we have also seen tremendous hope and it is that hope which motivates us today. secretary clinton is no stranger to this topic and she has been putting energy into strengthening both the u.s. bilateral relationships with the maghreb company -- countries and the ties between those countries themselves since she came into office four years ago. her term as secretary of state follows a distinguished career in public service as a lawyer in arkansas, as the first lady of the united states and more recently as a united states senator from the state of new york. she not only has the highest approval rating of any member of the u.s. cabinet, she has as

well topped the gallup poll for 16 years as the most admired woman in the world, besting the previous record of eleanor roosevelt who held the title for only 13 years. as america continues to engage in north africa, we are extremely fortunate to be served by a public servant who is engaged in these challenges day in and day out, who cares deeply about the issues and how they affect americans interest and who believes in an even brighter future for the people of the middle east. please join me in welcoming the secretary of state, the honorable hillary rodham clinton. [applause] >> thank you. [applause] thank you all. thank you very much, and a special word of thanks to a

friend and someone whom i admire greatly, general scowcroft. his many years of distinguished service to our country is a great tribute in every aspect -- in every respect. thanks also to john alterman john alterman and csis for hosting this conference on the maghreb in transition, seeking stability in an era of uncertainty. i also wish to acknowledge doctored tear out for his strong support of this important conference and members of the diplomatic corps as well. now why are we here, and why is this conference so timely? well to start with, what happens in this dynamic region have far-reaching consequences for our own security and prosperity.

and we know very well that it is most important to the people of this region, whose aspirations and ambitions deserve to be met. but recent events have raised questions about what lies ahead, what lies ahead for this region, what lies ahead for the rest of us who have watched with great hope, as general scowcroft said, the events that have unfolded in the maghreb. a terrorist attack in benghazi, the burning of the american school in tunis. these and other scenes of anger and violence have understandably led americans to ask what is happening, what is happening to the promise of the arab spring and what does this mean for the united states? i certainly think it's important to ask these questions and to

seek answers as you are doing today. and let me, on a personal note, start with what happened in benghazi. no one wants to find out exactly what happened that night. i have appointed an accountability review boards that has already started examining whether security procedures were appropriate, whether they were properly implemented, and what lessons we can and must learn for the future. and we are working as thoroughly and expeditiously as possible, knowing that we cannot afford to sacrifice accuracy to speed. and of course our government is sparing no effort in tracking down the terrorists who perpetrated this attack. and we are focused, as we must, on what more needs to be done right now to protect our people

and our facilities. we had another terrible attack yesterday. i strongly condemn the killing of a long time yemeni employees at our embassy in sanaa and we are working with yemeni authorities to investigate this attack and to bring those responsible to justice as well. but throughout all of this, we must not only focus on the headlines, we have to keep in mind the trend lines. we have to remain focused on the broader strategic question posed by these democratic transitions and their impact on american interests and values. let me start by stating the obvious. nobody should have ever thought this would be an easy road. i certainly didn't. however, it is important to look

at the full picture, to weigh the violent acts of a small number of extremists against the aspirations and actions of the region's people and government. that broader view supports, rather than discredits, the promise of the air of revolution it reaffirms that, instead of letting mobs and extremists speak for entire countries, we should listen to what the elected governments and free citizens are saying. they want more freedom, more justice, more opportunity, not more violence. and they want better relations not only with the united states, but with the world, not wars. i have no illusions about how complicated this is. after all, american foreign policy has long been shaped by

debates over how to balance our interests in security and stability with our values in supporting freedom and democracy. recent revolutions have intensified by creating a new birth of freedom, but also bite unseating old partners and unleashing unpredictable new forces. as i said, last fall at the national democratic institute, we have to be honest that american policies in the region will always reflect the full range of our interests and values, promoting democracy and human rights, and defeating al qaeda. defending our allies and partners, and also ensuring a secure supply of energy. and there will be times when not all of our interests and values a line.

we work to align them, but we do so acknowledging reality. and it is true that we tailor our tactics for promoting democratic change to the condition on the ground in each country. after all it would be foolish to take a one-size-fits-all approach, regardless of circumstances or historical trends. but in the long run, the enduring cooperation we seek and that our interests and our values demand, is difficult to sustain without democratic legitimacy and public consent. weeks before the revolution in egypt began, i told arab leaders gathered in doha that the region's foundations were sinking into the sand. it was clear even then that the

status quo was unsustainable, that refusal to change was itself becoming a threat to stability. so for the united states, supporting democratic transition is not a matter of idealism. it is a strategic necessity, and we will not return to the false choice between freedom and stability. and we will not go back our support for emerging democracies when the going gets rough. that would be a costly, strategic mistake that would, i believe, undermine both the hour interests and our values. now we recognize that these transitions are not america's to manage. and certainly not ours to win or lose, but we have to stand with

those who are working every day to strengthen democratic institutions, defend universal rights and drive inclusive economic growth. that will produce more capable partners and more durable security over the long term. today, these transitions are entering a phase that must be marked more by compromised then by confrontation, by politics more than protests. politics that deliver economic reforms and jobs so that people can pursue their livelihoods and provide for their families. politics that will be competitive and even heated, but rooted in democratic rules and norms that apply to everyone, islamists and secularists. muslims and christians. conservatives and liberals. parties and candidates of every

stripe. everyone must reject violence, terrorism and extremism, abide by the rule of law, support independent judiciary and uphold fundamental freedoms. upholding the rights and the dignity of all citizens, regardless of faith, ethnicity, or gender, should be expected. and then of course we look to governments to let go of power when their time comes, just as the revolutionary libyan transitional national council did this past august. transferring authority to the newly-elected legislature in a ceremony that ambassador chris stevens cited as the highlight of his time in the country. achieving genuine democracy and

broad-based growth will be a bomb and difficult process. we know that from our own history. within 235 years after our own revolution, we are still working toward that more perfect union. so one should expect setbacks along the way, times when some will surely ask if it was all worth it. but going back to the way things were in december 2010 isn't just undesirable, it is impossible. so this is the context in which we have to view of recent events anshaped our approach going forward. and let me explain where that leads us. now, since this is a conference of the maghreb, that is where i will focus because after all that is where the air of revolution started and where

international coalitions help stop the dictator from slaughtering many people and where just last month, we saw such disturbing violence. but let's look at what is actually happening on the ground, especially in light of recent events. we have to, as always, the clear-eyed about the threat of violent extremism. a year of democratic transition was never going to drain away reservoirs of radicalism, built up through decades of dictatorship, nor was that enough time to stand stand up fully effective and responsible security forces to replace the repressive ones of the past. as we have warned from the beginning, there are extremists who seek to exploit periods of instability and hijack these democratic transitions. all the while al qaeda and islamic maghreb and other

terrorist groups are trying to expand their reach from a new stronghold in northern poly but that is not the full story, far from it. the terrorists who attacked our mission and engulfing did not represent the millions of libyan people who want peace and a poor violence. in the days that followed, tens of thousands of libyans poured into the streets to warn ambassador stevens who has been a steadfast champion of a revolution. you saw the planes. wonder bread, thugs and killers don't represent benghazi or islam. and on their own initiative, the people of benghazi over ran overran extremist bases and insisted that militias to disarm and accept the rule of law. that was as inspiring inspiring

a site as any we saw in the revolution. and it points to the undimmed promise of the arab spring, by starting down the path of democratic politics. libyans and arabs across the region have firmly did the extremists argument that violence and death are the only way to reclaim dignity and cheap justice. in tripoli, the country's transitional leaders condemned the attack. they fired the top security officials responsible for benghazi. the government issued an ultimatum to militias across the country, disarm and disband within 48 hours or face the consequences. as many as 10 major armed groups complied. now, militias and extremists remain a significant problem in libya, but there is an effort

that has now taken hold throughout the country. as libya grapples with the challenges of forming a government, the international community needs to support its efforts to bring these militias to heal and provide security for all of its citizens. consider tunisia, the birthplace of the arab revolution. last year, an islamist party won a plurality of the votes in an open, competitive election. i know some in washington took this as an omen of doom, but these new leaders formed a coalition with secular parties and promised to uphold universal rights and freedoms, including for women. and the united states made it clear that we would be watching closely and would assess the new government by its actions, not its words.

this past february in tunis, students and civil society activist shared with me their fears about extremists seeking to derail their transition to lasting democracy, but also their hopes that responsible leaders and accountable institutions would be strong enough and willing enough to turn back that challenge. and indeed, we have seen an intense debate play out and tunisian society. for example, early drafts of the new constitution labeled women as complementary to men, but tunisia's act of civil society strong objections and eventually the national constituent assembly amended the text to recognize women's equality. civil society is wise to remain vigilant and to exercise their

hard-earned rights to safeguard their new democracy. like the hundreds of tunisian women who recently took to the streets to protest on behalf of a woman charged with indecency after she was raped by a police officer. these competing visions of tunisia's future were put to the test. violent extremists attacked the u.s. embassy in tunis and burn the american school nearby. how did the good the tunisian people in government respond? first, the government increase increased security around our embassy and promised to assist with repairs to the school, which they have done. then they publicly committed to confront violent groups and prevent tunisia from becoming a safe haven for international terrorism. following through on these pledges is essential. those responsible for the attacks must be brought to

justice. the government must provide security for diplomatic missions and create a secure environment for foreign residents and visitors, and the rule of law must extend to everyone throughout the country. the country's leaders also took the airwaves to newspaper pages even facebook and twitter to denounce both the attacks and the extremist ideology behind them, putting their own political capital on the line. the foreign minister flew to washington stand with me and publicly condemn the violence. and so we continue to support those changes that are occurring in libya and in tunisia and those leaders and citizens who understand what is expected of them if they are to fulfill their own hopes.

now the situation and the rest of the maghreb is different. morocco and algeria have not experienced revolutions, but recent events have also tested their values and resolve. last year when citizens of morocco called for change, moroccan society under king mohammed the sixth answered with major constitutional reforms followed by early elections and expanded authorities for parliament. an islamist party leads the new ruling coalition along with a 480 of other partners after 13 years in the opposition. and we have been encouraged that its leaders have sought to engage all moroccans and have focused on creating jobs and lighting corruption and we continue to urge them to follow on with all of their commitments for political and economic

reform. last month with anti-american protesters in the streets across the cities of morocco, the foreign minister travel to washington for our first-ever strategic dialogue. he could have avoided the cameras but instead he strongly condemned the attack and benghazi and embraced a broader partnership with the united states, and pledged that the country would continue working toward democracy and the rule of law. algeria also has much to gain by embracing the changes that are taking place around it, and we have seen some progress. the government held parliamentary elections in may invited international observers to monitor them for the first time and it moved quickly last month. a protected diplomatic commissions including u.s. embassy in to defuse tensions in the streets but still algeria

has a lot of work to do to uphold universal rights and create a civil society. a message i delivered at the highest level in person in february. what do these snapshots and stories from across the region tell us? on the one hand, last month's violence revealed strains of extremism that threaten those nations as well as the broader region and even the united states. on the other hand we have seen action that would have been hard to imagine a few years ago. democratically-elected leaders and free people in arab countries standing up for a peaceful pluralist future. it is way too soon to say how these transitions will play out, but what is not in doubt is that america has a big stake in the outcome. last month at the united nations

general assembly import guide led -- met with leaders across the region and i told each of them that the united states will continue to pursue a strategy for emerging democracies as they work to provide effective security grounded in the rule of law for economic growth and bolster democratic institutions. we made those three priorities the hallmark of america's involvement in the region. we have convened donor conferences, lefferts new partnerships through the g8, g8, the community of democracy, the oecd and we have stepped up our engagement with the arab league signing the first ever memorandum of understanding for a strategic dialogue between us. but we recognize that words, whether they come from us or others, are cheap. we talk about investing in responsible leaders and accountable democratic institutions, we have to be

followed by actual investment. we have mobilized more than $1 million in targeted assistance since the start of the reb lucian. and the obama administration has requested from congress a new 770 billion-dollar fund that would be tied to concrete benchmarks for political and economic reform, and i again urge congress to move forward on this priority. but let me briefly just address the three parts of our strategy starting with security. the recent riots in lawlessness underscore the challenges of safeguarding public safety in free societies and reforming security. for decades those forces protected regimes. now their job is to protect citizens, especially against specially against the threats of violent extremism. for some time, al qaeda and the

islamic maghreb and other terrorist groups have launched a track -- attacks and kidnappings from northern mali into neighboring countries. now with the chaos and ethnic conflict there, allowing these groups to carve out a larger safe haven they are seeking to extend their reach in their network in multiple directions. we are using every tool we can to help our partners fight extremism and meet their security challenges. we recently embedded officers with regional expertise into the u.s. africa command to better integrate our approach. across the region diplomats, development experts and military personnel are working hand-in-hand. across the region also we are partnering with the security officials of these new governments who are moving away from the repressive approaches that helps fuel helps fuel radicalization in the past. and we are trying to help them develop strategies grounded in

the rule of law and human rights. we are helping border guards upgrade their equipment and tighten their patrols so that weapons don't flood the region even more than they already have. we are helping train prosecutors to build forensic labs that can produce evidence that stands up in court. and last month, just days after the riots in tunis, we have launched a new partnership with tunisia to train police and other justice officials and we were very pleased that tunisia also agreed to host a new international training center that will help officials from across the region develop the means to protect their citizens security and their liberty. now the nations of the maghreb are not the first to struggle with the challenge of protecting a new democracy. and one of the lessons we have learned around the world is that training, funding and equipment will only go so far.

it takes political will to make e hard choices and to demand the accountability that is necessary for strong institutions and lasting security, and it takes changes in my -- mindsets to make those reforms did. in all my conversations with high-ranking officials in these countries, i recognize that particularly in tunisia and libya, the people i am talking to her often -- of security forces, in prison, seeking exile and in some cases -- in some cases tortured. ..

is building the capacity of 10 countries, providing training and support so they can better work together to disrupt terrorist networks and prevent attacks. we are expanding our work with civil society organizations, and specific terrorist hotspots, particular villages, prisons and schools. now, to set breeze economic and social challenges fueled the revolutions and the call for reform. and in order to succeed these emerging democratic governments need to show they can deliver

concrete results. so that is the second area we are focused on. work in the small medium-sized enterprises, which create jobs and alternatives to radicalism, bringing women and young people into the former economy, providing capital and training for entrepreneurs, helping emerging democracies update their economic regulations, investment laws, trade policies of their private sectors can actually squarish. we are establishing a tunisian-american enterprise found with initialization at join million dollars to stimulate investment in the private sector and provide businesses with needed capital. the overseas private investment, opic is that for a monthly guarantees and the millennium challenge corporation is helping address long-term constraint to economic growth. we have provided expert training for small business owners and job training 200 of young

tunisians. and i am particularly proud of the new $10 million scholarship fund, which was launched in august to help tunisian students study at american universities and colleges. we also look forward to working on economic issues with the new libyan government once is foreign. one of our top priorities is helping nations trade more with each other. but after i create new jobs and markets for products. by today, north africa is one of the latest integrated region and the world. it doesn't have to be that way. and opening the border between algeria and morocco would be an important step in moving toward that integration. the third key area and our strategy is strengthening democratic institutions advancing political reform. not an easy process.

as we can see from the difficulty in forming a government in libya. political progress has to grow from the inside, not imposed from the outside or abroad. but there are ways we can and are hoping. and libya, for example, the united states has trained hundreds of lawyer and civil society activists on election laws and offer tutorials to campaign managers and candidates in the run-up to the recent election. now we are encouraging civil society be pulling in age than drafting a new constitution that will protect the equal rights of all libyan citizens. similar efforts are underway across the maghreb, tailored to local needs and conditions in none of this is happening in a vacuum. the transitions occurred shooting in the maghreb are linked as you well know what developments across the wider middle east. egypt of course, the largest arab nation, a cornerstone of the region, we seem its new

elected leadership say that the success of egypt, democratic transition depends on building consensus and speaking to the needs and concerns of all egyptians, men and women of all faiths and communities. now we stand with the egyptian people in their quest for universal freedom and protection and we've made the point that egypt's international standing depends both on peaceful relations with its neighbors and also on the choices it makes at home and whether or not it fulfills its own promises to its own people. in theory, the assad regime reaches brutal war against its own people, even its territory slips from his grasp. i recently announced major new contributions of humanitarian aid and assistance for the civilian opposition. and we remain committed with their like-minded partners to

increase pressure on the regime. and in yemen, where we supported negotiations that eventually achieved a peaceful trend vision, we are working to prevent al qaeda and other extremist from threatening these emerging, fragile, democratic institutions. and prevent them also from finding a safe haven for which to stage new attacks. and when i met with king abdullah of jordan last month, we discussed continuing reforms to move his country towards more democracy and prosperity. so when all of these places and many others, the united states is helping the people of those nations chart their own destinies and realize the full measure of their own human dignity. dignity is a word that means many things to different people

and cultures, but it does speak to something universal in all of us. as one egyptian observed in the wake of that country's revolution, freedom and dignity are more important than food and water. when you tease and humiliation, you can't taste the food. but dignity does not come from avenging perceived insults, especially with violence that can never be justified. they comes from taking responsibility for oneself and one's community. if you look around the world today, those countries focus on fostering growth, rather than fomenting grievance or pulling ahead. building schools instead of burning them, investing in their people's creativity, not encouraging their rage, empowered women, not excluding them. opening their economies and societies to more connections with the wider world, not shutting off the internet or attacking embassies.

i remain convinced that the people of the arab world do not want to trade the tyranny of a dictator for the tyranny of a mob. there is no dignity in. the people of benghazi told this world loudly and clearly when they rejected the extremists in their met, what they hoped for. and so did the leaders of libya when they challenged the militias inside of the two spoke out against violence and hatred. that is the message we should take on the events of the last nine. now, i want to add and close with one more thought about what happened in benghazi because as you might expect, that is for me and all the men and women of the state department, very personal. diplomacy, by its nature has to

be often practiced in dangerous places. we send people to diplomatic posts in 170 countries around the world. and yes, some of those are in war and conflict sounds. others are in unstable countries with complex threats and no u.s. military presence. that is the reality of the world we live in. when will another prevent every act of violence or terrorism or achieve perfect security. our people cannot live in bunkers and do their jobs. it is our solemn responsibility to constantly improve to reduce the risks that people face and make sure they have the resources they need to do those jobs we expect from them. and of course, nobody takes that more seriously than i am a

security professionals at the state department do. chris stephens understood that diplomats must operate in many places where soldiers do not or cannot, where there are no other boots on the ground and security is far from guaranteed. and like so many of our brave colleagues and those who served in our armed forces as well, he volunteered for his assignments. last year, our ambassador to syria, robert ford, was assaulted in damascus by pro-regime thugs. but he insisted on continuing to meet with peaceful protesters and serving as a living manifestation of america's support. and when he drove to the battered city of hama, people there covered his car with flowers. people like chris and robert

represent diplomacy and america at its and our best. they note that when america is absent, especially from the dangerous places, there are consequences. extremism takes root. our interests suffer and our security at home is threatened. so we will continue spending our diplomats and development experts to dangerous places. the united states will not retreat. we will keep bleeding and we will stay engaged in the maghreb and never were in the world, including those hard places where americans interest and values are at stake. that's who we are and that's the best way to honor those whom we have lost. and that is also how we ensure our country's global leadership for decades to come.

thank you all very much. [applause] >> at the white house briefing, spokesman jay carney was asked about vice president biden's remarks in last nights presidential debate concerning details of the attack against the u.s. consulate in benghazi last month. this portion of the briefing is about 20 minutes. >> this forum hosted by the center for strategic and international studies focuses not tunisia, morocco, algeria and libya. north african country as part of what is known as maghreb. experts on the region talk about political come economic and security dynamics since the start of the arab spring up raising in late 10. this is about 90 minutes.

>> thank you. i'd like to welcome you to our third panel of the day. my name is haim malka can a senior fellow and chair of the middle east program here at csis. we had a great morning with a lot of substance. we started out talking about the political trends come and turn all political dynamic in each of the countries in the maghreb. then we moved on to talk about the economic and social economic at many countries in the region face and i'll bring the strands together and look at how the political and socioeconomic trends in the region intersite and affect stability moving forward in the region, and the transition in those countries that are in transition zone in those countries that have navigated the arab uprisings of the last year and a half relatively smoothly. to make sense of these complicated trends, we really have the a-team of north africa analysts here today, a group we've been trying to bring

together for a long time and i'm happy that they joined us today. first is dr. yahia zoubir, international relations and management and director of geopolitics at jerome i'd adtran seven school of management. he has recently published an article called tipping the balance in light of day of spring comes who's going to focus not only on algeria and tunisia, but on regional implications of what we've seen transpire over the last year and a half. after dr. yahia zoubir will be geoff porter, and longtime friend, glad you could make it. and finally, batting cleanup is dr. bill lawrence, director of the north africa project for the international crisis group. we are delighted you are here for this excellent panel and all turnover the floor to dr. zoubir. >> good morning. thank you for the kind invitation from john and haim.

haim was tough with me. he gave me a huge list of questions to address before coming here, particularly on algeria. so i will divide my presentation institute. what was prepared and the other one i will try to bring it because of the questions that came from the audience earlier today, particularly from a young diplomat, from the u.s. diplomat to ask about what is going on with the maghreb union and the imminent general and also a little bit of what is going on on the periphery of the maghreb because from my perspective we cannot distinguish the two regions, the maghreb terms of security issues. the one want which redresses about algeria.

i would not repeat from the fed this morning, but some point might be similar. it was very interesting that in january 2011, if you watch the media, and i remember in for a, he contacted me and said what is it going to happen in algeria? algeria's next, definitely next. so the question we raised was, why is it that algeria was not next? and we tried to give it some explanation. and because of the limitation of time, i will give only a few points. by the way, culture and steep ride all the time about everything. you know, the arab spring started with us in 1988, and even in malaysian, it was not easy. in 2010 there were a few cases.

they repeated it. there were 10,000 rise in 2010 alone. these drives were identified by the national and algeria. so why didn't it happen? well, one of them is by the way, and i think was mentioned this morning by my friend, algeria is not a state. you can take which you want, but it's not a polar state. i remember algeria was going to tunisia. it's free, is a democracy compared to what was going on and tunisia, if you look at the cartoons in the newspaper and so on. so it's not that stress that you could see, you know, in tunisia, for instance, were even in egypt. at the same time, the

liberalization, i'll tell you why we talk about 88 and bring it back because one of the things being repeated is the fact that the authorities reacted to the arab spring. in many ways the reaction they had in the 1980s is being repeated. you know, history never repeats itself, but at the same time, there are some similarities you can draw. so that is one of them. the regime after the 1988, you know, i don't have to have a soul sequel at events. but there is a real hope of democratization, with between 1989 and 1991. but that came to a standstill. even after the young of the

civil strife of the 1990s, the hope with the new president after 1999, you know, they were -- in the sense that we fell into the same procedures as others, electoral authorities are a hybrid type of system. it's not a democracy, but it's not real dictatorship or what have you. so this was one of the things, you know, that's a disappointment, which explains both the assurance they can make a revolution, what is going to happen? other civil war, or what is it that's going to happen? what is it going to bring about? the second one is one of the most important things, and i think that that hugh roberts is right in emphasizing that there is no coordination between the

socioeconomic and political grievances. or there's no opposition that is capable of channeling the socioeconomic grievances and turning them into political demands. if you recall in 2011, you had more or less two movements. one was making socioeconomic demands than a smaller one nicknamed the hair of the rcd was making demonstrations that had some political demands. you know, he was ridiculed because there's no anchorage. the opposition coming and i'll come algeria is one of the few countries in the world in which the opposition never powers. they criticize, but the only one that is capable of coming to power and almost it was the sis.

the regime is extremely astute and not allowing. and so this is why you have the fragmentation, the multiplication of the political parties. from 1989 until 1999, there was only one party that was allowed, the fma. and then there was nothing. and then all of a sudden at december 27, you have a multiplication of parties. nobody knows them. they're from other parties and so on and so forth. the population doesn't know them, et cetera, et cetera, which i think if you try to explain why this happens, i think it has a logic from the regime's perspective. the machine is always fearful of wanting in algeria because this is what they have dealt. and no, the whole thing, you know, the regime is ending in

that sense because of age. but legitimacy and participation if you want to see the lg resistance, is a lack of participation. people don't participate. and so, by multiplying, there was hope that perhaps there would be more, but at the same time it's also to weaken the national assembly. which the algerian sea is just a rubberstamping institution in algeria. one cannot discount the fact in algeria, you know, the history of it, about violence. 1864, 1962. after the october via, the 1990, also brutal. there is a mark on the psyche of segments of society. so this explains some of why there is no reform in any large

scale. the other one is what happens at the borders of algeria. i repeated, nobody, i'm not sure people realize the extent to which the image, the negative and should have made out is among the population at large. neither was identified with the war. and to see nato bomb brothers and sisters in libya, that played a role in syria and so on and so forth. so jillions are very picture and they might hate the regime. but when it comes to his history, that is a different story. a talk already about the weak and divided opposition. the financial resources, algeria as he read the press, basically algeria did the imf a billion

dollars. so let's show you how to spot at the latest figures, about 200 u.s. dollars. so it's doing quite well. they can buy it anybody. you demonstrate and you have a reason your wages and so on and is given and it's creating. and by the way, not everything is negative. there have been huge investments in infrastructure, to be champion of the infrastructure and so on and so forth. another reason i identify as the services now, the police and all that. they do not shoot at the lord do anything crazy. so they know how to manage or control so they would not do what they did in 88. another one is the c. scott is

not popular among the masses, is not the ben ali and he doesn't have any negative image. people still like him, believe it or not. people see him as the one who has restored social civil peace and so on and so worth. now, how did the regime react to the uprisings? they are quite comfortable. felt like he was not under any pressure. he was taking time to introduce reforms and basically whatever reforms were initiated were already a paper before. the problem in algeria is not coming you know, the walls or the reforms, but it's the execution. so it is fair. now, i think -- [inaudible] five minutes.

so, today you ask me questions, so i'll talk about the maghreb. after all a dude in a q&a. you asked me about the role about the sanaa and algeria. haim said police commissioners happen in egypt and so on might affect algeria. the sanaa systemin algeria access. they are round, they are in the mosques. they are very present in a lot of the mosques in the country in big cities mainly what i call. but they are involved in business. they're involved in a lot of business, especially electronics and so what if you go to some neighborhood, all the mobile phones are controlled. surveyor affair with how powerful they are, but again, so

far they have not shown any interest in stirring trouble. so that's one of the questions you asked me. yesterday also about the succession. anybody who says or claims that he might know who may come to power in algeria is coming in now, has a special crystal ball but unfortunately i don't have. if you want to see, i think it is possible to look at what's going on and you have to observe developments within the fln. again, the problem is in the sln and r&d, both leaders on one hand, they both are facing troubles within their respective parties. so there are things that work in their favor in things that don't. i think if you look at the sln,

no matter how they'll charisma he might have, but again, he could be interesting to look. now, since i promised, and the audience. i wrote the piece in all modesty, i wanted to look at how the region, the maghreb itself might react to is going on. and again, i like history and history is her interesting and revealing. look at how the arab maghreb and union came about at the time of difficulty for all the regimes in the region. libya, algeria, tunisia or morocco. they were faced with so forth. the same thing happen now. if you had observed, and again, of course there's always these alliances and made a dissolved and so on and so forth. but what happens?

initially the libyan situation create a big headache for them. there is article of faith team of the treaty, where fun of us is attacked, the other one will come to his rescue and so on and so forth. so i can assure you, i know in the media there were rumors that algeria was so afraid, the regime is so afraid of the way that it supported gadhafi. i can assure you there is absolutely zero evidence of that. if anything, i am sure they were quite happy to see gadhafi go because he had caused more headaches than anything else. but there are real fears, what should they prove the algerians rate. i won't cite one of the u.s. high diplomats without total confidence the algerians were right about the situation in libya. so the situation in libya creates a problem for all the maghreb country. and because of time, for

tunisia, tunisia itself in many ways the idea. the trades that would be with the highest. the volume is the highest. it was only the e.u. first and then libya for tunisia. there were a million and a half from libya to tunisia. you know, not only to race, but they were the house speaker's biggest attempt to tunisia and so on. so tunisia, people from the world bank and i don't dare say more about that, but i got the figuration african development, were how the situation in libya affected the tunisian economy. from a security perspective, the jillions weren't the most effective because if you want to know the nightmare come and again you speculate because no security -- national security official would reveal this to

you, but you can put two and two together. but algerians are extremely fearful of having enemies surrounding them. another is, all borders. right now there is a moroccan border with iraq. look at tunisia, libya, with instilling in now. then you have molly and france wants to come back. the u.s. is saying is the worst-case scenario. it's the biggest nightmare. so tunisia is one thing. morocco, but there is a shadow government, as anyone who thinks the kgb is drilling in morocco with a little bit delusional. but what happens is there is this need, basically if you look at the. , i would stay starting

september, october 2011, you see this huge movement coming in now, calling for the revival of the area sensory union. then you have the security conference of all of them. it dissipated all of a sudden. now the libyans are not saying camino, send us back to gadhafi or so on and so forth. they are signing agreements. algeria signed agreements on the border issues. libya and algeria are working together and security issues, try to help reconstruct and so on and so forth. unfortunately, i am a realist and politics. i am afraid that coming you know, once the storm has weathered the way, the duma will regain its old traditional way that it has been.

i [inaudible] or influence and so on. but i think if i have to choose among the five -- [inaudible] but if there's one country that is shown really the greatest interest in revival is tunisia. and tunisia is primarily i believe for economic reasons. with respect to the western sahara, it has a relatively moderate position, you know, natural, wi-fi, leave us alone. i don't mean to get into this. i am not sure. guess we are for this and that, et cetera, et cetera, that it's

more something coming from the zucchini as a personal thing. but i honestly believe that if there is one important aspect for the future of the maghreb. another set resubmission in the world with the lease, the lowest intraregional trade. that's less than 3%. and i think that the construction for the arrival on real grounds, obadiah may call the democratic legitimacy is trying to push for the reopening, but i'm not so certain. so we are in a situation of wait and see. and you know, there's guarded optimist, but i'm really afraid that the situation in northern mali can be a cause of concern for all of the sahara countries

in the region. thank you very much. >> i would've loved to hear you continue speaking, but jeff would never forgive me if you went on for another minute. the floor is yours. >> well, good morning, everyone. i want to thank haim for inviting me down and csis for hosting this event. i think the timing is very opportune. a lot of stuff going on in north africa and its great opportunity to have hopefully an in-depth discussion about it. as to what to thank my fellow panelists, dr. zoubir, dr. lawrence. john ultimately said this morning with the all-star team of north africa experts. and i appreciate the sentiment. i really, really do.

this kind of like being an all-star ping-pong player. bush is not that many of us. i also, you know, i appreciate haim's comments come at the 18th of north africa at first and in that same sort of reference, i think that dr. zoubir has to be mr. t. so, i'm going to do something i think a little unusual for a conference and what a guy to do is put at a couple scenarios for were north africa may be heading. i don't intend the scenarios to be exhausted. i don't intend to be definitive. i hope they're speculate i certainly hope they are provocative and can serve as fuel for discussion. before we do that, though, it is important to establish a base case. would we think the countries in north africa are? from there we project our us to where they going. what are they trajectories? lastly i would like to propose

alternate trajectories that we have the most likely scenarios, reasonable trajectories animals think these are on, would be the circumstances that would throw them off trajectories and present with the ultimate scenario, a positive or negative. i will focus primarily on algeria i think i'm going to further contribute to that, but it's also libya come which hasn't been addressed the start of a lot of detail. i will be beside tunisia. there's several reasons for that. first, there is a fantastic speech this morning. served as a bellwether for political change since september september 2010 and 2011, he sees it as burden its season is no longer serving as a catalyst for change. there's dynamic change, but the countries that surround tunisia in countries that they've been pushed on the path by tunisia

are now following their own courses. they are now following the path they put them out on. likewise, i'm not going to talk about barack grew. and a number of morocco experts in the room, dr. lawrence, but also morocco is relatively insulated from regional instability, with its instability or northern mali. i said this morning, it structured its political system in such a way that it can adapt political change in a relatively controlled fashion. so i'm going to be beside morocco, instead i will focus on algeria and libya. the reason i took some algeria and libya. also because there is an outside potential for regional instability and algeria where

that be come to fruition. these are significant countries intertwined with regional dynamics. libya has a population of 6 million produced a month or 6 million barrels of oil today. potential is for much higher experts in the future, libya could be a phenomenally rich successful democracy in the southern caribbean. another scenario is that it could be somalia, a stoned surfer me up as a failed state. wanted into more detail about that. likewise, algeria has huge potential. i notice there's a number faces in the crowd or i'm getting older. i think it's important to emphasize how big algeria is. i don't think it's something we think about on a day-to-day

basis. from algeria to its southern border is greater than the distance from algeria to london. it is an enormous country. likewise, the distance that the border but algeria shares with molly is greater than the distance from new york to chicago. it is 800 miles. it's a huge territory that has to be covered. not only is algeria big comets also phenomenally wealthy, a burst of $200 billion. hugh mentioned this morning that also has a powerful and military and are not oil and gas potential. it is the key key subpart north africa. and where libya and algeria to his instrumental in the regional dynamics. you know, one of the challenges

of study and algeria and libya is that there is some analytical problems. in the case of libya, when the events of 27 started, when the rebellion started in february 25 men, we found analysts here in d.c. back to the to catch up and make up for lost time and libya. a lot of the times of reference they were trying upon to understand political dynamics and libya for books written 20 years ago and based on research conducted 30 years ago and they've been scrambling to develop a knowledge base ever since. there is a similar gap about algeria, a similar misunderstanding. a lot of analysts don't travel to the country and they generate a certain perspective on what's taken place in the country from outside of it. that necessarily produces problems and misunderstandings. i think a good example in the case of algeria is the predominant understand if i algeria did not have eight arab

spring. dr. zoubir covered it, dr. roberts covered it, but there was this sense but algeria did not have an arab spring because the state to play twofold method of repression and maintaining subsidies on certain staples in increasing salaries whenever there's a protest. it denies algerians have any agency whatsoever. the interpretation seems viable. went to travel, you get a sense of algerians didn't have an arab spring, largely because most algerians didn't want to arab spring. there's a difference between protesting for salaries and the revolution. many algerians want to improve standard of living, want more money or have they worked, but didn't want a revolution. now, they have been vindicated as they see what happens in

tunisia and libya. so just to begin with a stasis for where i think they are now penberthy might be going in the future. in libya, 2012 was a good year. after you never a political milestone the government has set up for an august 2011, the past electoral law. they get out the vote campaign command elections commiserating in ceremonies on the date they anticipated to have them. they have the congressional and election and all the sudden libya got derailed in a pretty significant way. now we are starting to see the positive of 2012, the functionality is really becoming clear. i'm not talking about benghazi and i'm not talking about on the shows. instead what i'm talking about is the ouster of the new prime minister 25 days by the same

body appointed -- that appointed him. on october 7, his dismissal was argued that the product the libyan political scenes of the revolution. the regional tensions, tensions between the gadhafi administration and those in the administration. tensions between this and the opposition and stayed within libya and there were tensions different ideologies. the success that libya had over 2012 made it seem as if the gac, general national concept and the ntc can't overcome these tensions. the october 7, it was pretty clear that these tensions were still a driving orson libyan political dynamics. one of the reasons -- they were numerous reasons. among them are he didn't take into account the regionalism of

libyan factions. he favored over the so-called by mark mucha brill. he was too harsh sources who worked in the gadhafi administration. he privileged oppositions in exile rather than opposition members under the gadhafi regime. he scrambling to figure the system or they themselves had elected. they're trying to figure the system whereby to vote for the next cabinet, whether they will prove wholesale or individual cabinet members. but we see is libya coming down and discretion really hard. and these are the political problems. if you talk about security problems that opens up a whole another barrel of monkeys. it's got the persistence of the militias. some incorporated by the state for adults meant infiltrating state institution. you have some militias that have developed sources of income that

allowed them to remain independent entities for the foreseeable future without fear of intervention by the state. it is a very dynamic picture. over the short term, in all likelihood they will stick doggedly to the political process. they're going to stick to the roadmap they laid out in august august 2011. they're going to try for two great political institutions that appear to a popular legitimacy. at the same time, the political process will become detached and everyday concerns of libyans. i think the gmc stands a strong chance of muddling through the prime minister of crisis. they're going to appoint a cabinet, a constitution which will draft a constitutional committee which will draft a constitution and at some point. the riskier is a preoccupation with the political process, the government will neglect other aspects of governing.

infrastructure, all fall by the wayside except when they serve members of congress to get a point of ministers. beyond all this, or behind all this, the libyans will have hydrocarbon receipts. oil companies demonstrate they have a tremendous risk thresholds, that they have a huge amount of political uncertainty. just think about iraq. so, is libya continues to have hydrocarbon receipts, this would've libyans a sense they have revenue and resources to address problems as they come or when they become too acute. i expected it would remain touch and go. they act with impunity and the relatively predictable manner. regarding the jihad a threat in libya, some of the attendees have writ extensively about this. you know, i think the jihad he

threat and libya will remain. its effect on the the ground for now. but at the same time, there is an increasing awareness of the threat jihad is posed in the state is now going to be in a position to grapple with it. so while the threat remainscometh in a diminished capacity for that update was the devastating effect we saw september 11th. i said i wasn't going to do this. okay, so it's not a horrible story, but it's not a great story. it's okay. i don't think it's a bad one either. after the legislative elections in july 2012, the president feasterville crisis. he was forced of having to choose a prime minister and he was dealing with difficult party politics in the country, but at the same time there is a sense among political that whoever is

chosen as prime minister in the 2014 presidential campaign. ultimately, so they'll would say, didn't democrat, and allied and following allows appointments come it is clear algeria's political change and i'm sure this will prompt a series of questions in the discussion and question-and-answer session. they are given to provide the economy and prepare the country for the 2014 presidential elections. regarding the first mandate, to help with algeria reformed the hydrocarbon law, they try to attack in the hydrocarbon sector's. that is also put in place. these will disappear entirely,

but it's beginning to walk back. and regarding the second mandate, the preparation of the presidential election in 2014, this is a much steeper challenge. retyped about the popular legitimacy as institutions. so i'll has to somehow re-create that an egalitarian interested in politics again. one of the ways he started to do that as he started to introduce greater transparency measures and also start to promote younger technocrats in different administration and reject dynamism and the government tour overseas. ross is seen in the ministry of foreign affairs. one of the persistent questions about algerian politics is whether the political leaders arise from within the system without the system.

and a related questions and dr. roberts mentioned this morning, homage to political parties and algeria matter? if we assume hypothetically political parties don't matter, and personally i don't think they do. and they are large sea for show. it is the cinema theater. the key political decisions are taken by a group of elites, spanning commerce military and politics. and we assume that political leaders arise from outside the system. then it's possible that some of the political decision-makers who backed the obese interest in the past at the accent of a long-term vision for the country could return to the political milieu after gone in 2014. in the past decision-makers have been shown and profoundly ideological, nationalist, statist, protectionist and

isolationist tendency. but the algerians required is algerians for nigerians, but only for a certain class of algerians, the oligarchs that dr. roberts referred to. there is a strong possibility that a juror once become a thief job and fall back into the sluggish pace of recent years. there's not going to be a revolution. i don't think there's going to be rebellion. a assurance of focus on surviving somehow in the informal economy, focus on getting out of the country, boucher will effectively chop off the map. it will return to the status quo and be this big glaring absence in north africa. the largest country in africa disengages from the international community, and the instability that dr. zoubir mentioned or northern mali has to be right that without

algeria's help. what will make this all the more claimed is the worst fears were to come. i mentioned before the libyan government is committed to the roadmap but they've laid out into the political process. but i'd like to bring you back to the middle of 2011. at the time, mr. cusa, gadhafi's head defected and when he defected he said he would become like somalia. at the time, most rooms of reference were to mogadishu, a blackhawk down moment. unfortunately it had a blackhawk down moment. but i think moussa coosa is a very nuanced guy. and i think what he was referring to was a much broader frame of reference. i would libya look lakes somalia? but other dimensions as well.

what i think moussa coosa in that process, that they will transition into warlords in some parts and it will be manageable, but they will be hamstrung by their lack of sovereignty. oil revenue will be giving out by the regions that produce it, but it will be deprived with those parts of the country that produced it will be deprived of the historical and financial course. they will support aaa's attempts to the entirety of the state, but i think the u.s. would find itself unwilling or unable to help the u.s. are advanced u.s. agendas. at the same time, you could have a disinterested, disengaged algeria but next-door. as to be a very negative scenario. i'm perpetually the optimist and

i don't like the chicken little role. there's chicken little from the sky always falling. so what if in the happy circumstance, none of the negative smears come to pass peer word essay it fit in, and one would expect to happen? i think there's a real potential with algeria. it's going to have to be one predicated on algeria bringing and has a tremendous capacity and enormous potential that the u.s. can help them realize both domestically. if algeria manages, and may have its moment in the sun. period in libyacometh u.s. has to remain. there's no question. in addition to other political programs there's logistical and pragmatic ones in the libyan state your support in solving them. the libyans don't have the administrative bandwidth to deal with the challenges that they

are facing on a day-to-day basis. these are not the type of capacity throughout the country. with sustained u.s. support, i think libya could stand a positive path without sustained u.s. support, than i could have scenario, this mali mediterranean scenario that moussa coosa mentioned that become a real possibility. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you. bill. >> good morning. i will line up as a right fielder. i'll do my best. there is a verb for this i learned in my winters ago. i forget what it is, a verb in arabic which needs to arrive in a foreign country that your luggage. well, that have to make in the sidewalk down the street to get clothes for this evening.

but i am here and i survived and i'm going to try to round out the discussion with some further points. i think what is given this morning, we've heard a lot more about continuity than change and i'm going to talk about what changed in the context of the arab spring. and i'm going to talk a little bit more about libya because i think i was one of the missing pieces this morning and that's a country spend the most time focused on. the two biggest changes and they have related to each other that came with the arab spring, and this is in terms of the actual movement spawned by the arab spring, were what i called old order, new order dynamics. there are new ideologies of change coming from you, which are radical and are having

profound impact on every aspect of life in the world. unlike some of the tropes and continuities we've been looking, they are anti-tribal, anti-patriarchy, and anti-quietism the case, anti-but the zen, anticorruption, pro-transparency, inspired by things like wikileaks, which is a former state person i'm still upset about. we can't deny that it had a huge impact on the person. the other surrogate major change in terms of the movement of the arab spring is the hybrid nature of these contests are touring movements and the major hybrid i think a secular islamist divide. there is the show at least in the countries -- there is a confiscation between the islamists and arrest at a certain level of society and then there's the rejection of the lower level of society.

we sunday february 20 alliance be preceded in all the countries. we saw it in algeria in the 90s where it began. there's a strong desire among young people not to have the secular islamist debate. and most social confiscation these days is not along those lines can about everything we see in tunisia in the news is actually, just appalling number out of a hat, 90% as here this morning the economic and social related and probably 10%, or to read the international press, it was the exact oposite. just briefly for them and national crisis group is a quick recap. 18 countries were shaken by the arab spring in ways that any other year or two would be front page news, but were drowned out in the cacophony of the change. it's also been very bloody and

came into the narrative of why there is reticence. we just passed 60,000 dead and millions displaced and affected encourager mattock ways. for those keeping score, i heard a long time about how international theory had to be avoided and that the libya motto is disaster. but for those keeping score, syria has just passed libya in terms of a consensus figure of death over 20,000 now and has from a reposting release the trauma of nonintervention, the charm of intervention. and the other sort of crosscutting thing about specific countries, the whole south ambulatory trend, which i think is pretty significant.

.. >> the west was liberated in a way that is much more complicated than the news would have us believe.

it was liberated much throughout these newly formed armed groups. there was a lot of negotiating of firing going on. you can read about it in our report about how the dealmaking was made, libya was very much about these deals made at the local level. one way that i find that libya is very different, and it was touched on this morning, is that libya has kind of a islamic thing going on. the backlash in benghazi put together another thing. there is a very different thing.

notwithstanding what we are seeing in the news. i thought the uprising that cosby was usually important to think about when 30,000 people rose up a couple of weekends ago to throw out malicious -- the population once again taking control of the situation. which brings up another thing that i said in introductory remarks for the arab spring -- we view it as people against regimes. but just as important, we have the spring against the regime and people against people, and i'm happy to talk about those other dynamics that we have as well in the q&a. it is not just the people of the

regimes. following the benghazi, a well-known libyan academic said something that stuck with me. he said the libyans have no idea where they are going, but they're going to get them faster than everyone else. according to a nasa astronaut. the funny way that it makes sense is that is libya right now. there is a kind of civilian activism, which is even superior to egypt and tunisia. the thing that most concerns me right now and doesn't concern most libyans was the attack on the most libyans dismiss this as, you know, buildings being attacked, big deal it is much more significant because they are starting their and they are unearthing 400 year old graves.

then they attacked the greek orthodox priests in the church and they are talking about christians and the fact that this was going on, most libyans didn't care about the types of these shrines when you start looking at what is actually going on, this is the first part of a worse trend that is probably going to lead to some bloodshed. >> on the positive side, libya has been responding to some things from earlier today, that are more researched. more research than any other countries and very well educated. libya, their scenario, libya can

come out better than tunisia and egypt. because it has a special -- special types of resources that can come together to avoid a somalia like situation be met just quickly on tunisia, and i apologize to those who heard me speak a few minutes ago before, i saw the tunisia and arab spring is split into two oversimplify. there was an older, more working class, andrea angrier spur earning based on the algerian protests, which has been since 2005. there was an urban growth gender, more middle and upper class, more socially networked, more employed from a more hopeful, more human rights oriented. it kind of push the revolution over the top.

at first arab spring that didn't succeed. we did a security report last may. our main concern was disarray and i am even more concerned about that immortalization of the police force in tunisia, not laid out in the embassy attack and the recent repeats, there are some very serious problems, particularly in libya and tunisia. problems with the police that need to be addressed. but most important, is the economics come as we have been hearing this morning. notwithstanding the fact that economics does depend on political access. i don't think it is very well understood. remember all the reports in 2011, they were the most diverse, fastest-growing --

best-performing. >> the three main things in my mind the issue of the university graduates, he tipped the balance and that is the failure of the distributive state and the solutions during the economic panel. it comes from the failure to create jobs in this area spread but basically the free markets are not free to create rural

outspread i don't know what the solutions are -- it's not going to be agriculture, but we need to realize it. this is very high unemployment including tunisia. that needs to be addressed. as i said this morning, i completely agree that the corruption of the most important thing. just to point out the facts, -- the top 200 tunisian firms it is a transfer of ownership or control of some monopolistic business interests to even more and salubrious character. when that is going to have to be addressed going forward. we will have to suggest that, not to dwell on nigeria, as i

said before, but the language of protest among the youth is largely made in algeria. and it is part of this whole sort of youth rebellion that has been going on. [inaudible] february 20, movement, it reached its apogee last spring. seventy of their activist leaders -- they have regular protest in the hundreds, sometimes thousands, the biggest protest in morocco are in the labor movement, stuff on youtube you can see online.

but my main concern about morocco is that it becomes more like algeria in terms of the constant and hyper localized instability. you know, he saw that all these towns these are local, social, and economic issues and this feeds into this highly alienated youth. there is a lot more that can be done in that area. but let me point out something very important. that they won landslide electoral victories with very

few votes. pjd.1.2 in the country's 1.2 million people. so was pjd, spoilage and another party. so you still have highly alienated and disconnected people for the most part. those are willing to do something unorthodox. it is sort of a huge disconnect from all although i do agree about youth as a priority and not just the negative. finally come in a and revolutionary moment, the most important thing is entrepreneurship but not just in

the sme economic sense. i gave a speech in tunisia a year ago at the conference and we were talking bout performs in the education system. i said no need to shake up -- some interesting examples across the universities, now the university in cairo being one, they are huge possibilities, okay, opportunities, there is a massive amount of highly educated youth who want to solve problems. it is not necessarily about the macroeconomic things, although those are important, it is about puttinyouth to work.

to dissolve the whole range of socioeconomic issues, it can be done come it's not that expensive to do. and it involves throwing out the old ideas about how institutions need to be organized and read from the ground up. >> okay, bill, that was very concise review. thank you for staying within your half-hour. >> that was great, thank you. >> i heard a couple of games when we talk about morocco and algeria today i am wondering how governments today, old governments or existing governments, or managing popular expectations of people that things can change quickly enough were in a substantive way fast enough.

i guess the question that i will ask the panel, and i request that you enter them very briefly, is what will it take to trigger or reignite more widespread protests in a place like algeria or toronto or even tunisia. what kind of triggers could ignite more demands for quicker change in more substantive change in some of these countries? yahia zoubir, would you like to start? >> regarding algeria, my response is what the new government is trying to do. that is to do away with the informal sector, which employs thousands of people. the objective is to have eradicated by the next remedy and that is in july next year. then we are up for big trouble.

again, for tunisia, it is probably the same problem. not regarding the informal sector, but the economy in general, we are also up for trouble and advice to the other countries as well. >> i'm going to jump out of order and it just wants to speak, he can let us know. >> i totally agree with what he just said. the major source of employment and place where people work is not the private sector, which needs to perform better. it's not the public sector, it is formal sector jobs. until these governments stop seeing the formal sector is the enemy and start turning the informal sector into the tax revenue for macroeconomic

stability, more importantly, sustainable jobs, a terrible economic situation, we are seeing clampdowns turning it into an engine for growth. i think the one-word answer to the question is outrage. when you talk to young people come you spend a lot of time doing that, it's all about that and people get outraged enough about whatever the thing is, subsidies, as was mentioned this morning. that is what gets people out. we do have these checks -- they

have been using a little bit of a heavier hand in it a bad way. but, i think -- whatever outrages the population collectively enough, these moments of turbulence and turmoil. >> yeah, i agree with you. i'm not going to belabor it, but i think it is important that when we talk about potential drivers for change or catalyst for change, we have to assign it a certain likelihood or probability. otherwise we could envision all sorts of scenarios that could bring about dramatic change. you know, while i agree with the possibility and the crackdown on the informal sector indicting

things in morocco, serving as a catalyst for widespread protests and demands for political change, we have talked about quite a bit this morning is doctor robert said, the master plan and trying to anticipate these things, they have built a system that is better than they perhaps intended. as mentioned this morning, it has also built a malleable catalytic moment. >> i open the floor to questions.

>> i was just wondering if one of the greatest challenges in moving to this transition towards stable states is the military power and centralizing the legitimate use of force, i was wondering if any of you see this scenario in which it is achieved without a centralized military force or power, and if so, what implications that would have for national security? >> well, the tunisian and military performed amazingly by not. the civilian led military by not playing the roles.

95% of the 250,000 or so libyans walk around with weapons, trying to keep the peace, not make mr. as i said, the kind of bloke and that a group comes in and puts out the fire and everything settles again. most libyans want to keep the peace until it is stable. in terms of algeria and rocco

again, -- the criticism of the military, the military aspects i think the action is, you know, in the nexus between the islamists, the youth elements of all the varieties of your talking about and the security forces, that is where the action has been. you are the geopolitics that. >> began, you know, what is going on in the eastern front with libya, and i know that some troops had to be redeployed because of the traffic of armaments and drugs and other issues that was the

problem. >> that is what you're asking questions that haven't been asked. this is something i was thinking about. you know, it is slightly related to your question. but it is something that doctor roberts mentioned this morning. he talked about the possibility for a triple transition and algeria where the chief of staff [inaudible name], [inaudible name], they are all indisposed or died, either together or in short succession. you know, one of the things that i think is important to understand is that [inaudible name] has pushed it out of the military, now, it does leave the other parties.

but this debate about what is going to happen, it is no secret that it is old. everybody knows it. everybody has had these discussions about how we can transition. i suspect while there is the potential for instability surrounding a triple transition come at the same time, i think it would be misguided to think that the individual actors within these groups haven't been putting in place their own plans for a transition. you know, i don't think anybody in the algerian leadership wants to see instability. will you do see is whether it is amongst those people or that people, you do see compromise. my view is that if the military has walked back, and even if we do have this scary triple succession scenario, it will not lead to profound instability.

>> thank you. >> i will ask the panel for the assessment. as the security sector, for example,. >> i'm sorry, what is a security factor? >> refugee. we know from the historical record that refugee camps -- they are a source for instability throughout the world. so the situation now is the

same, that we are going to see the situation regarding the solution of the refugees. >> i'm going to say something else i didn't say. three other stressors when we talk about instability in the region. in addition to refugees are, it was mentioned this morning, the euro crisis in the crisis with food prices. the euro crisis has effective -- that is quite profound. the countries are surviving. they are surviving in part due

to the moves of their government which are smart through the support of the international financial institutions, which has to remain or you could have serious problems for that. energy prices are high and i think that is clear. i think that is a couple hundred million per year of budgetary -- [inaudible] january of 2000 and 11 was called a riot. and it wasn't. but the huge world crisis includes hitting us now with russia and america and we are talking about the potential of food riots in this part of the

world. about 200,000 in all directions. you have big refugees there and i was mixed about the contents of migrants in the trafficking that goes with it. the numbers in morocco, the numbers that people are coming through, seeking refugee status, seeking to get to europe, they are hiding in the forest, they are sent back to the algerian border, country by country, region by region, you have the population as destabilizing as the refugee people are. in this case, all this black

economy and it could be quite nefarious. let me just conclude by saying that we do, in washington, have a kind of 9/11 prism, we do tend to overthink counterterrorism and so many other things. the policies are highly unpopular. i think it's a big part of economics. they were really smart about it early on, but then all the resources that put to the military side. even though they tried to be more social and economic early on. we need a much more holistic approach. >> thank you, for your question. i think that one of the reasons for this situation is precisely the issue of refugees. i have recorded some of what happened and what happened

already since the return of those who are serving in the brigades under qadhafi. 284,000 fled. 60,000 went to a certain place, you are talking were talking of the neighborhood and what was going on, if the situation -- if there is an intervention, as the french are willing to go -- for their own reasons -- i don't need to get into it. so it could aggravate the situation. now, if you referring to the refugees and the other camps, that is also another big problem, which has been lingering for 35 years. for those who are promoting

democratization and so on and so forth, instability, still have the relations and so on and so forth. you still have those problems that have not been resolved. there is no move forward. we are still domain, relations will still be area and i don't know whether behind the question there is some insinuation -- a refugee of one part or another, terrorist groups or something of that nature, of course, this is a possibility, according to the older security people that i talked talk to, if you look at the groups, they are composed of people coming from all parts.

they come from some other groups. the big issue, in my view, when we decide to intervene the consequences of it. especially today, it's not just the refugees -- you have a very serious issue that is coming up. there is a huge security issue that also needs to be taken into account if we want to avoid disaster in the entire region. >> thank you, we have about three minutes left. i see a lot of hands up in the front. i think we will take one more and we will wrap it up. >> it is on the same issue. everybody is talking about you're going to have intervention. what is the attitude about being part of a force or supporting it -- i mean, can they stay on the sidelines while there is a military intervention backed by

france or whoever? what impact is going into the northern portion of the country, what will it have on these countries. >> it was sort of to have a comprehensive approach. as you know, they have set up a committee of the major chiefs of staff to try to address that. they even came up with an intelligence unit for those countries. i think for the algerians, was to try to separate what are legitimate issues, local issues, which algeria has been the mediator, several times.

it has been lingering since the 60s. the first rebellion was in 1963. then in the 1990s, the early 1990s, this was the algerians who mediated. you know, basically they lived under dire conditions. algeria has been saying that in order to deal with the security issue, you have to address the economic problem. what algeria's policy -- you know, what the algerians are trying to do is to separate [inaudible]

so they are saying let's separate these two legitimate issues, surprisingly, why was he overthrown three months before the election. he was going to leave anyway. so there are suspicions that the french were behind it. but the algerians tried to separate the two issues. you know, the government has not lived up to their part of the deal. and, you know, al qaeda and the islamic and this he west africa g5, but it affects only algerians. they kidnapped foreign workers. so the algerians are saying, wait a second, they have friends

behind it and they said the precipitous intervention is not going to result in anything and don't forget that algeria has an important population to our population as well. so that is why they are against it, and initially, i think that algerians was with the same way. but from the "washington post" this morning, have some doubts about that. >> thank you. jeff, you get the last minute. >> okay, i will try to answer your question. in a simpler fashion. you know, i think it's important to remember that algeria has three hostages in the northern portion of the country. you know, we have all seen the tremendous political consequences of putting your ambassadors in harms way here in the u.s. and i think i'll curia is extremely concerned about the

fate of its diplomatic members. it is also important to remember that algeria lost two members of its foreign service in iraq, following the u.s. invasion there. so i'll curia is very wary of the unintended consequences of military action, and is very mindful of the lives of its foreign service members, just as any country it is. >> thank you. >> this has been a very rich look at the domestic politics in each of the countries and looking at stability internally but also across the region. i have certainly learned a lot and i hope you have all learned a lot. this is concluding the first part of her conference today. before we go on to bigger speakers, i just want to make a couple of announcements. lunch is going to be served as a birthday lunch at the back of the room. we have a little bit less than one hour to eat lunch. everybody has to finish lunch and be in this room at 145 because the secretary of state,

hillary clinton will be coming shortly after that. so i hope everyone is hungry. please join me in thanking our speakers. thank you. [applause] >> at the white house briefing, jay carney was asked about vice president biden's remark in last night's vice presidential debate. concerning the details of the attack against the u.s. consulate and then got me last month. this portion of the briefing is about 20 minutes. >> good afternoon, everyone. thank you for being here. before we start, i just thought that i would say i would just like to say -- i took extreme pleasure in watching the debate last night

because of the way that he demonstrated his passion and wisdom and joy that he brings, the job of serving the american people as vice president. and working with this president to bring about positive change area for the middle class and for this country. i thought he presented a remarkably strong case for the policies that this president has put into place and the policies that he believes are the right ones to move the country forward. they capped off for me what was an extraordinary day because i had the distinct pleasure of bringing my son for his birthday to the national scene yesterday. that is why i was not traveling. i have to say that was a brilliant finish to a great game. way to go nationals. with that, i will take your questions be met thank you, jay, i want to ask you about

the testimony of the oversight hearing. i'm wondering, what can the vice president mean? what did he mean by we? did he mean the administration, did he mean the white house? >> he was speaking directly toward himself and the president and the white house. and over four hours of testimony, the testimony that you just referenced, no one suggested that the requests for additional security were made to the president or the white house. these are issues, appropriately, better handled by security professionals professionals at the state department. that is what he was talking about. again, if you look at the testimony, four plus hours about

it, there was no discussion of requests for personnel. those are things that are handled by security personnel at the state department. so that, i think, it is very clear you look at it in context in terms of what the vice president was responding to. >> after that testimony, it would seem that he would have at least conceded. >> and attacked by congressman ryan was to try to suggest that the president and the white house was responsible for the security and benghazi. these kinds of issues, of course, it is appropriate. these issues are handled in the state department by security professionals. and i think that that is the context of that conversation. >> if i could start off with a

broader context, the argument given for rejecting the standard security, when we think about it, a desire to turn over security with forces. that is one of that this administration has used when withdrawing from iraq and from afghanistan in 2014. given the green on blue attacks, doesn't give the president caused? does it make you reconsider whether the motivation here -- even though the security impact beyond the own people? >> let me go first to this point. as i said the other day. there is no question that an attack on a diplomatic facility and benghazi that resulted in the deaths of more americans, have demonstrated that there was

not adequate security to protect those americans. that is why the president and the secretary of state acted so quickly to take action to ensure that our diplomatic personnel around the world, but they were protected and the secretary of state of the president's direction created an accountability review board that will assess and investigate these very issues regarding security diplomatic facilities. secondly, this president is very concerned about the safety and security about the diplomatic personnel around the world. one way to measure that is in the budget priority but he has put forward in his budget, and what he has done a spot every year to restore funding to diplomatic security, that has been slashed by the republicans, congressman ryan, specifically. so i think going back to last night's debate, the lack of

understanding about how this works, it slashed spending for diplomatic security and he now takes a different position on these matters. and the aftermath, which is clearly a part of an effort to politicize, which should not be politicized. this is obviously a tragedy in an incident that is under investigation but by the fbi and when it comes to diplomatic security and the security of our diplomatic facilities by the accountability review board established by secretary clinton. more broadly, this is a topic as a matter of policy that was discussed in an enlightening way last night in this debate. when it comes to afghanistan, the president, working with countless allies, have established a policy to draw down our forces in afghanistan end to end that war by 2014.

you know, what you saw last night was a debate about whether or not that is the policy. in this president is committed to bringing our forces home from afghanistan. the purpose, as the vice president said, of setting a deadline, is to make it clear to the government as it was made clear to the government in baghdad and iraq, that they began to take increasing responsibility for their own security, so that when it comes to fighting and sometimes dying for the sake of afghan and the afghan people, the afghan forces increasingly take on that responsibility. not american men and women. that is why we were drawing on those forces there. the president is very clear to that. he made clear in the campaign

that he would end the iraq. he did so. he has made clear that he will be the focus of attention on what was a neglected war in afghanistan, refocus our mission in al qaeda and decimating al qaeda's leadership in afghanistan and pakistan. he has, and he has made clear that this is not a war without end. we will insert american forces to do the job that should be done he is happy to have that debate. >> [inaudible question] [talking over each other] >> the fact of the matter is -- [talking over each other] three basically he doesn't make those assessments. >> there are thousands of diplomatic assessments around the world. there are countless facilities around the world. i am saying when it comes to the

number of personnel who are in place at consulates and embassies and other diplomatic facilities around the world, those decisions are appropriate and appropriately made at the state department by security personnel. when it comes to funding, yes, this president bites to make sure that embassy security and diplomatic security is adequately funded. to make sure that that funding is restored when efforts on capitol hill are made, principally by house republicans, including congressman ryan to cut taxes by the wealthiest 2% of this country. you bet, that's the president's responsibility, and he has demonstrated that he has kept that responsibility. >> you were saying that the president and vice president have never been briefed about the fact that more security was needed and benghazi. you were saying never in the presidential briefing, never briefed.

>> what i am saying is that matters of security personnel are appropriately discussed and decided upon at the state department by those responsible for it. obviously, it is the case that everyone responsible for national security, and those were knowledge about -- knowledgeable about it, that libya is a dangerous place. >> what you are doing is actually saying something that was not said last night. [talking over each other] >> there was a 4.5 public hearing with requests and adjudicated personnel were there.

>> i just want to be clear. [talking over each other] >> i'm not going to sit and talk to you about this. >> no, i'm not. i'm saying that matters but how many personnel are assigned to embassies and consulates are not decided at the white house. they are decided at the state level. >> on september 10, he sent out a press release is for the president himself was briefed, not the state department. the president was briefed about consulates and other consulates around the world. in the security posture and head of the 9/11 anniversary. so you're not only saying that you are not briefing, but the president was not told about security problems about benghazi, a conflict that had been targeted. [talking over each other] >> no intelligence suggested there would be an attack at the benghazi facility. absolutely, categorically, that is a fact. [talking over each other] >> this was targeted several

times. >> in advance of which this administration, just like the previous administration, took action to prepare for potential acts against the united states or our allies that might take place as part of the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks in 2001. what i can say is that there was no actionable intelligence indicating that there would be an attack at the benghazi facility. >> you are saying the president on september 10, was not told broadly about the consulate and benghazi being targeted, problems or concerns, the investor wanting more security, yes and talk about any of that? >> again, i cannot get into the specific details of a classified briefing and argument. but i can tell you that he was

not told. >> you are saying that there is no actionable intelligence, and i think that it's is pretty clear, what i am saying. there was no actionable intelligence regarding the and coffee facilities. i understand you're trying to politicize this and turn it into an issue in the campaign. the president, from the minute that it happened, has been focused on finding who is responsible for those who killed the four americans, making sure that our diplomatic personnel from the world is secure, investigating what happened and following the facts wherever they may lead and ensuring through the secretary of state, that actions are taken and a review was undertaken to find out what happened with regards to security and benghazi and what he could be moving forward at that facility and others that are in places --

[talking over each other] >> four americans were killed. the mother of sean smith told cnn that she doesn't feel at the administration is getting to the bottom of this. what do you say to her? she just that i want to know what happened my son. >> nobody wants to know more than the president of the united states. rather than speculate and hypothesize and take political shots on tv, this president has major that the investigation is happening, that the state department set an accountability review board, and that is underway. and the secretary of state said just moments ago, what has always been the case is that we have been very transparent about what we know. and made clear that as hours and days and weeks have past five and more facts have come to light in what has been revealed with the investigations underway, we have gained a

clearer picture of what happened and what did not happen. and we have been very transparent about that. from the beginning, unfortunately, because this is not our tradition. an effort by some to turn this into a partisan fight. that is a shame. especially when we are talking about brave men and women, those in diplomatic service, to serve democrats and republicans, who represent the united states and the american people in america's interests abroad, often in very dangerous parts of the world. that is sometimes forgotten by many. the fact is that we have a lot of civilian personnel in places like libya in places like afghanistan and iraq and other

regions of the world, where there is risk involved in serving your country and representing america's interests. the president is focused on finding who is responsible, bringing them to justice, investigating to the end what happened and taking appropriate action to make sure it doesn't happen again. >> [inaudible question] >> the former libya security chief, talked about a request that was made for additional security that request -- they never made their way to the white house? >> at thousands of facilities around the country, do not and are not adjudicated at the white house.

this is reviewed by the accountability review board, and that process should be allowed to be continued and not be prejudged. but it is certainly not the case that the assignment of security personnel at diplomatic facilities is made of the white house, nor should it be. what is the case is that the president set his priorities in the budget, and the president has spent levels of funding in his budget that have been routinely slashed by republicans , especially in the house. charges have been made about the concern over diplomatic security by those who routinely slashed funding for security in order to pay for tax cuts.

>> [inaudible question] >> i think what is obvious to anyone who understands how this works, requests for additional security are not made to the white house. they are made to the state department, which is where the appropriate security personnel set these requests. >> [inaudible question] >> we weren't told -- [talking over each other] >> the vice president was speaking about himself and the president and the white house. he was not referring to the administration, clearly, since there was a public hearing for 4.5 hours, where it was discussed openly by individuals, working at the state department, the requests were made. obviously, he was referring to -- he wasn't talking about the administration a large computer

speaking about himself and the president and the white house he met in the course [inaudible question] does the president take away from having watched that debate and what kind of a change in williamsburg can we expect? >> let me tell you a couple of things. questions about campaign strategy, they practice, more appropriately addressed to my colleagues on the campaign. i can tell you that as you know, the president watched the debate last night. he thought the vice president did an excellent job. an excellent job presenting this administration's case, this president's case, for why we

need to continue to move forward, why we need to make decisions about her economic policies that allow our economy to go from the middle out instead of from the top down. and why we have taken the actions that we have and need to continue to take actions that we have to enhance america's national security interests around the world. the president watched the debate on air force one flying back from florida with a number of staff, who were traveling with him, and i think he spoke to reporters afterwards. he made clear that he was very pleased with the vice president in his presentation last night. you know, this is about getting into campaign strategy -- this is about very serious issues of public policy. very serious matters about

choices that we make and budget priorities and we were just talking about one of them. the president believes, as the vice president made so clear yesterday, that we cannot afford to put back in place the policies that helped precipitate the worst financial crisis in our history. the least sense of our lives and the great depression. we cannot afford to raise taxes on the middle class in order to give tax cuts to millionaires and billionaires. we can't afford our seniors and future seniors cannot afford to have their health security undermined by a system that would turn medicare, one of the greatest accomplishments for older americans in the history of this country, into a voucher system that puts seniors at the mercy of insurance companies.

this president will not do that. i am confident that he will make that place, when he had the opportunity to go before the american people in a debate next week. i know that he feels the vice president made that case last night. >> see the next presidential debate next week. ..

as well as six months he spent in libya during last year's revolution. this is an hour and 20 minute. >> thank you very much for taking time to moderate this. i want to take a moment to remember a friend who welcomed me when i was in the province of aleppo. and recently he was killed in fighting in the city of aleppo. i want to start today by talking about libya. the biggest dilemma in libya is the problem. libya has been characterized by institutions that began in the monarch either both the 1951 to

1969. gadhafi continued this. he was frustrated with the people's power, where he developed power to the municipalities. he dismantled ministries and want to distribute revenue directly to the people in the central government planning. and the t. 98 green charter rights work was written quote, people exercise power directly without representative, i'll quote you it was formal versus informal tour date that institutions, in 1977, gadhafi created the treaty which i direct power and he greeted revolutionary courts that powers the prosecution, execution. he did so shifting to revolutionary one. all the policy to make this date

nonexistent down the course of power is the intelligence services and the extraction and sale of oil. the 2011 revolution continued within days of the revolution can outbreak of the revolution, the national transitional council was established to be the opposition covered. the people there didn't have a lot of governing experience. early on, libyans were very happy, but over time we revise there is no transparency with the militias. militias are the country will power brokers. the regional and ideological militias engaged in richer grecian against gadhafi roil this papers also fighting between militias from the city city -- ventana and the shaba. there's also these militias

engaged in car theft, vandalism and whatnot. so today's dilemma is there's no state institutions, weak national security forces and strong militias that translates into a weak central government. in the political level we have major regional and ideological troubles. the national force led by former trade minister mark mosier borough team on top of the recent elections. but a lot of enemies and the most powerful militias from libya come from the city of ms. rabbit. there is historical animosity between sugarless tribe and the city of estrada. gadhafi toilets towards enemies becoming prime minister. a party called the national fund descended from the libyan

national salvation front, the opposition group created in 1981 were able to get positions of president and prime minister. because there was the opposition party, they sacked the cabinet but exiled dissidents and the local power and cheery and spirit have the regional party in cities where the strongest militias came from. they were not happy with the cabinet representation that bad either. i'm also there were a number of gadhafi loyalist of a given post. they said we don't know these people because they came from brad. we don't have regional representations. and that basically undermined and torpedoed the government and now the country has no prime minister when it's dealing with the biggest crisis since the revolution with the benghazi consulate attacks.

i want to not talk about syria. this is written in the third century b.c. syria has been historically unstable. raise the nomad nomadic invaders persecuted minority. and independence air, never had a cohesive state, crews encounter occurs every few years but to what the journalist called the struggle for syria. history changed with how often became in 1970. he created a strong central government that provided people stability and security in exchange for them getting freedom and built a coalition of minority that is buffered by the rule sunni were. when the revolution began, many of the members of this coalition began to unravel. when we saw a protest in the

sunni urban city such as hama, there is no surprise these areas rosa and the insurrection in the late 1970s and early 1980s. the sunnis they were very upset because the regime brought in alawite from the northwest area, where they dominate, said they were circuiting a lot of better pleasures. so there were pillars of the regime support. it means there's a lot of trouble for the regime. we shouldn't estimate the same power of the regime. many people still supported. people don't want is stability. a lot of people don't understand that the resolution is about. when i was in the province, there were certain areas of my friends didn't want to take a because the reader per regime.

were not talking about alawite villages. from time to time we hear the regime is on the brink of collapse with no cities to follow the rebels with air power. the core pillars of support in the regime are still there. the rebels are very good. they noted house sustained assault trooper escort nation between different brigades. they know how to gather intelligence and sophisticated tax with different types of weapons. i didn't see the certain success of libya where rebels would move forward during the day and fallback at night and didn't hold positions. you see a lot of difference with the rubble in syria. jihads have been spotted on the front lines in considerable numbers. there are some westerners there is your hottest camps are in an

organization that's trying in young syria and peered the syria army as it's called is not happy about it. you hear disputes between unions and searing units. saudi arabia and units that telephone line may be getting better weapons. the regime is not going to collapse and wither away as we saw in iraq and libya. it scores based on compact regimes. they have legitimate interests and concerns and international communities need to address. if damascus falls, the alawite move to the northern regions to predominate. this will give them a coastal area and a border with lebanon was to fund them and provide them with services because that is why the regime chemical weapons because they could not

allow to the massacre. i finally want to finish by talking about egypt. and the muslim brotherhood there struggles within the organization between a group that wants to stay true to the groups and another one that knows that governing decimates changes. the group can't decide what it wants to focus on and as a result is message news model. the islamists really stumbled out of the gate. when i talk about this and not talking so much about the muslim brotherhood sim out out the party. the muslim brotherhood had years of political experience and representation in the parliament. but the alawite are new to politics. they just don't know how to beat the politicians. so what we need to do in this situation is look back at other

countries, where religious parties came to power in very large numbers to understand what happened. a great example is led by rabbis. when the department started winning in numbers in the 1980s and 1990s, it had to move people into parliament they didn't have political experience. they were second-tier political hot. what happened as a number of people when they came into the knesset and saw the power they had, they took advantage and a number of members went to prison on charges of corruption, charges of including its leader already seen the beginning of disenchantment on newer parties. one of the mps was caught in a car with a woman at a late hour in a deserted area. another one came to parliament

with bandages on his nose. she said he was beat up internet jihad plastic surgery. they are to set an example for the society and what we're saying is is they are corrupted by the same temptations that undermine politicians and the mubarak regime. egypt's dilemma is that she can't govern a society that is ungovernable. no political party. there's too many people, not enough jobs for not of agricultural resources. egypt is falling into denial. it's not only the slow pace of political change that's frustrating them. the summit there were widespread electrical shortages. people more responsive government and not is just not going to happen in a country like egypt. we hear a lot about the lack of security. the police aren't on the street after the revolution. people are being robbed.

one of the big things when i was in egypt this summer that was in the papers as the people were getting beat up in hospitals. they're coming in and just beating people up. another thing that is frustrating people. shifting back to politics coming president mohammed morrissey was criticized on charismatically when his chief strategist disqualified from running for president. he was described as quote a spare tire, unquote. much of the criticisms against anwar sadat in 1970, the quickly made his mark on society on a course no one will ever forget. of course by the participation in the 1973 war with the egyptian forces and the suez canal after the disaster the catastrophe of 1967 and secondly the camp david accords.

the question were in washington is whether the revolution will be to egypt shifting out of america's orbit. we need to look at egypt's history. he was very close with tito from yugoslavia, but by the time he died in 1970, russian fighter pilots were skirmishing with israelis over sinai and virtually a second language in alexandria because the city had so many russian razors. he egypt, economic policy drives foreign policy. first it it was the rationale is the americans. if morrissey shakes ahmadinejad's hand at a conference, it doesn't matter because a president obama calls him and gives him a dressing down, morsi tells them what to do. egypt does not going to find new friends like china to help them out. you know, morsi had a big trip

to raise china recently. he can provide the billions of dollars in it like it is. countries like saudi arabia and qatar have the money they need, but they've just been slow to dole it out. the only america that has the experience and resources to provide egypt with the aid that it needs. finally, what to type briefly about the cyanide pellets, foreign jihad is moving in their as recently as 16 attacks with cross-border raids into israel. this is a trauma that's not going to go away for a long time. the egyptian army has not prepared to do with this threat. does not experience in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. during the islamist insurrection of the 1990s, the government relied on the police forces and services to put down the rebellion, not the military.

i also one of the promises relies on an organization. these are the people according to the camp david accords, egypt has to demilitarize sinai on the border in what is called area c. is there are no soldiers. the only people from this organization are the css. these people are rejects that couldn't get in the army, but need to serve their mandatory, military conscription. and these are the people that are basically on the front lines. so because the military does not have experience dealing with the g hotness, what happened is they needed to respond to society's anger after the soldiers were killed, so they just bombed a base. and anybody that has experience with counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and is the first you want this to capture someone because they can give you information and intelligence about an organization.

when you drop bombs on people coming are not going to get anything. now we are hearing this from a dropped the bomb, there was nobody than i. if people died, it was death on the side of jihad is. on the stats on the side of jihad is, we usually have and locals said there was no funeral spirits of the g hotness problem will not go away and basically the army doesn't have an answer for it. thank you. >> what is your understanding of what happen at benghazi at the american consulate? >> what happened in benghazi had nothing to do with the protests. we know based on discussions with people that were there that night, and is a highly sophisticated attack, coordination, the weapons that the people used and the use, the

blame rests on an organization called sharia and this is a very small brigade, the regional brigade is more ideological based on-site february 17 and tear that be a shortcoming which has a strong winds. and for an organization to better blame like sharia, they can't fight on the level of other is just missing the point. as for more information comes out, we are going to land about organizations and movements that were involved that have a lot more to do than just libya. >> meeting while? meaning it's very likely there is a foreign component driving what happened on the ground that night.

>> interview, having spent six months in libya under gaddafi's fall, do you say the attack on the conflict is sort of an outlier for sort of represent future that be a? >> that's an excellent question. the problem in libya is that there's just no security. we saw this in the regional security report that came out in the congressional testimony recently. in the security situation is much worse than we first imagine based on some of these documents. the security services can provide any level of security. there's this retribution against gadhafi loyalist. there's all types of attacks against people you don't like. so, what is going to happen and also what we look at this historically would have been in

libya. historically, and i'm talking really since foreigners came in, the two nations in romans, they've always controlled coastal areas and they've always been controlled as tribes were movements opposed to the government. only really went gadhafi took power and establish a real regime, was he able to extend power, authority and to the land. and now since the revolution, we've seen a recession of that power. it's only in some coastal areas, not even that. and because there is no national security services committee can provide any security. at this point in time, if the united states gave the libyans the names and places, the perpetrators of the attack on his highly unlike her they could apprehend them without really pitching, possibly having american special forces on the

ground. >> geoscience of how chaotically bas? iraq 2007 is sort of like a 10, where ritchie scored the situation in libya? >> i spent a lot of time during the war there and i saw the security situation progressively deteriorate on a slippery slope. i think right after the american affectation in 2003, tore straight before april 2004, when he had the incidence, we see progressive deterioration of the situation in libya. and if the government doesn't step up and establish authority soon, we could see what happens in iraq. >> but what are the differences? is there a shia sunni component in libya?

my impression was not much to compare chirac, right-click >> i think it's a 90% era and 10% sunni arab in the rest are minorities, so you're not going to see the minority split. the royalists are we. the gadhafi loyalist, they are engaged in some type of attacks, but they're not as strong as what we saw in the insurgency at the beginning of iraq group but what we will see is the weak central government doesn't have control over the entire country and that invites foreign g hotness to establish camps. you can't really take that. >> to have a sense of the scale of that? is that a marginal problem? is that a growing problem? that an exaggerated problem? >> well, the thing is we thought there were small numbers of foreigners early on and they

were just in the same until the attack. and then we were shocked by the level of sophistication. >> so you are saying then the attack was not an outlier, or perhaps a harbinger? >> is possible there could be more attacks like this in the future. >> of nisei foreigners, where are they from? >> that's the thing. we don't know exactly where their friends, but the people involved in the attacks don't appear, based on discussions with the people who were there that night, just don't fit in with the libyans. >> let's turn to aleppo for a moment. tell us, c-span viewers also recording this, so the audience kind of which you did in aleppo,

what she saw, what risks you took, the kind of dangers that independent researchers, journalists like yourself a stranger report on the conflicts? >> well, this was the first conflict i was then with a flight i was on didn't have air supremacy. so you're exposed 24 hours a day to the attacks and you basically can't run away from fighter jets. so that's a problem. when we're in places like iraq, american bases, you came to expect that. and when you go out, you might take some idea in a moment. are you just didn't have this constant fear that the other side to come out. basically what would happen is

we would be shelved between 11:00 p.m. and three to 4:00 a.m. and there would be 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 p.m. when the helicopters and fighter jets would come out and attack us. and you can't shop with long-range cannons and missiles and whatnot. >> how did you get into aleppo without getting into anything that would be something you would want to say publicly? and what did you go exactly? >> i was there in september and basically at this point in time, the rebels had taken over the check point. so you're able to crossover from turkey and go when any move around in those areas. but there are some rows that are very dangerous because some of these roads are in that the regime controls and they shout randomly at vehicles to drive on the road.

>> and what is the strategy of the assad machine other than survival? what are they strategies intact takes? >> basically when he is in or forsake us, they're just trying to scare people because there's a random bombing with no overall strategy. the bomb landed in agricultural fields, which is far from the urban area. so you wonder why they do that. many of the bombings don't mean any casualties because they're just trying to scare them. they are trying to wear down the morale of the rebels and citizens that support them and they want them to know we are here and not going away. >> is that proving to be successful? >> at this point in time, no.

nothing successful. which are doing is the regime is turning more and more people away, especially in the rural areas. one of the villages that is in was a very prosperous village. a lot of new building was up and you think wow, they benefited from the machine policy. it's not a poor village, but what we see is the regime is turning the civilians who are either on the fence or didn't like the idea of instability that was caused by the revolution. it shifts them done tours seem that the regime is barbaric, so to speak is that what it's doing. that is the way these people feel, they don't trust the regime anymore, and they are very angry they would target civilians on this level. that said, the regime still have support. you're not going to see this a lot in the media because you're not going to talk to a lot of these people.

even those in syria think that people are saying these things because they are scared. i was able to spend some time for some serious than others in the region from damascus. and they really supported the regime. they did not like the rebels. they did not like what they were doing. >> and what sort of ethnic or trials for these people from? >> these were sunnis. these are urban, middle-class sunnis and they were just not supportive of the revolution. and you still have that, like i said in these villages. in aleppo, still support the regime. >> and what is your prognosis for the regime? >> and eventually the regime is just going to fall. they can't sustain this over the long term. they can't win the war. they have not taken -- the rebels haven't taken any in the city, but the regime wishes focused on putting up rush fires

in too many places they can't do it and is gradually losing more and more. >> or would it take from whence we get past this election and the weather is the romney administration or obama administration, what could that administration do to actually change the facts on the ground? ..